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Abstract
This Note argues that it is essential to the success of the Sale of Goods Convention that the
current controversy regarding exclusions be resolved uniformly by all ratifying nations. Part I
discusses the negotiations that led to the Sale of Goods Convention’s exclusion provision. Part II
identifies the Sale of Goods Convention’s primary goal of uniformity and the arguments promot-
ing implied exclusions. Part III examines the arguments favoring express exclusions. This Note
concludes that a uniform resolution allowing only express exclusions would be most consistent
with the overriding principles of the Sale of Goods Convention.
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS
FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS:
CREATING UNIFORMITY IN
INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW
INTRODUCTION
The unprecedented surge in international commerce dur-
ing recent decades has furnished a need for a workable uni-
form law for the international sale of goods.' On January 1,
1988, the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the In-
ternational Sale of Goods (the "Sale of Goods Convention") 2
entered into force by eleven of the fifteen nations that ratified
it.3 It provides uniform substantive rules of law governing the
formation of contracts for the international sale of goods and
seller's and buyer's rights and obligations.4 However, a con-
troversy exists regarding article 6 of the Sale of Goods Con-
vention, which permits parties to exclude the application of the
Sale of Goods Convention and to apply their choice of law to
their international contract.5 It has been questioned whether
parties may impliedly exclude the uniform law by trade prac-
tices and course of dealings.6 Divergent views revealed by na-
tions during negotiations may result in inconsistent interpreta-
1. See Posch, On the Law of International Sale of Goods: An Introduction, in SURVEY OF
THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 3 (1986).
2. S. Doc. No. 9, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1983), 52 Fed. Reg. 6264 (1987), 19
I.L.M. 668 (1980) [hereinafter Sale of Goods Convention].
3. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE: A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE ON JANUARY I, 1988, at
365 (1988). The Sale of Goods Convention was done at Vienna on April 11, 1980
and entered into force on January 1, 1988. Id. Parties to the Sale of Goods Conven-
tion are Argentina, Austria, China, Egypt, Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, Lesotho,
Mexico, Sweden, Syria, United States, Yugoslavia, and Zambia. Id. The Sale of
Goods Convention entered into force for Finland and Sweden on December 15,
1988, and for Austria and Mexico on December 29, 1988. Id.
4. See Sale of Goods Convention, supra note 2; Pfund, U.S. Ratification of 1980
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: Official English
Text, 52 Fed. Reg. 6262 (1987).
5. See Sale of Goods Convention, supra note 2, art. 6, S. Doc. No. 9, at 23, 52
Fed. Reg. at 6265, 19 I.L.M. at 673.
6. See J. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 106 (1982); Dore & DeFranco, A Comparison of the Non-
Substantive Provisions of the UNCITRAL Convention on the International Sale of Goods and the
Uniform Commercial Code, 23 HARV. INT'L L.J. 49, 53-54 (1982); Note, Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods: Applicability of the United Vations Convention, 69 IOWA L. REV.
209, 235-39 (1983-84).
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tions of the Sale of Goods Convention, 7 threatening the uni-
form law's success.8
This Note argues that it is essential to the success of the
Sale of Goods Convention that the current controversy regard-
ing exclusions be resolved uniformly by all ratifying nations.
Part I discusses the negotiations that led to the Sale of Goods
Convention's exclusion provision. Part II identifies the Sale of
Goods Convention's primary goal of uniformity and the argu-
ments promoting implied exclusions. Part III examines the ar-
guments favoring express exclusions. This Note concludes
that a uniform resolution allowing only express exclusions
would be most consistent with the overriding principles of the
Sale of Goods Convention.
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SALE OF GOODS
CONVENTION'S EXCLUSION PROVISION
On April 11, 1980, the United Nations Conference on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods adopted the Sale
of Goods Convention.9 Prior to the Sale of Goods Conven-
tion, private international law groups made several unsuccess-
ful attempts to unify international sales law.' The primary
purpose of an international sales law is to provide a uniform
law to apply to the private transactions of companies with busi-
ness in different nations."' The adoption of the Sale of Goods
7. See infra notes 14-75, 97-99, 118-22 and accompanying text.
8. See Sturley, International Uniform Laws in National Courts: The Influence of Domestic
Law in Conflicts of Interpretation, 27 VA. J. INT'L L. 729 (1987); Note, Unification and
Certainty: The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 97
HARV. L. REV. 1984, 1988 (1984).
9. See Sale of Goods Convention, supra note 2, 19 I.L.M. at 671; MULTILATERAL
TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY'-GENERAL: STATUS AS AT 31 DEC. 1988, at
367, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/7, U.N. Sales No. E.88.V3 (1989). The Sale of
Goods Convention was held open for signature at the New York United Nations
Headquarters from April 11, 1980 to September 30, 1981. Id.
10. See Posch, supra note 1, at 5-8.
11. See Sale of Goods Convention, supra note 2, art. I, S. Doc. No. 9, at 22, 52
Fed. Reg. at 6264, 19 I.L.M. at 672. Article l(1)(b) also provides that the Sale of
Goods Convention will apply, although neither party to the contract is a member of
it, when the rules of private international law subject the contract to the application
of the laws of a signatory nation. Id. Article 95 permits a nation to declare itself not
bound by article 1 (l)(b) at the time of "ratification, acceptance, accession, approval,
or ratification." Id. art. 95, S. Doc. No. 9, at 41, 52 Fed. Reg. at 6278, 19 I.L.M. at
693. The United States made this declaration in order to delimit the sphere of the
Sale of Goods Convention's application. See Pfund, supra note 4, at 6262.
SALE OF GOODS CONVENTION
Convention is acclaimed as the world's first potentially success-
ful step towards uniform international trade law. 12 However,
the long-standing debate over the means by which parties may
exclude the uniform law and choose an alternate law to govern
their contract still remains.13
A. Early Attempts at Uniformity
The controversy over implied and express exclusion has
existed since the earliest efforts to draft a uniform law for the
international sale of goods.'4 The traditional commercial na-
tions favored the principle of party autonomy, which grants
private parties maximum freedom in negotiating their con-
tracts. 15 These nations favored a uniform law that would exist
as one alternative that parties could choose to apply to their
transactions. 16 As a result, these nations sought a uniform law
that allowed parties to vary its effect as they desired. 17 In con-
trast, nations with less experience in commercial contract law
wanted a uniform law's protection.' 8 Generally, these nations
favored a uniform law that governed all transactions, not as
one of several laws from which parties could choose.'" They
feared that merchants in stronger nations would escape from
the uniform law by utilizing contracts of adhesion,2 0 as well as
12. See Posch, supra note 1, at 6-7.
13. See infra notes 55-75 and accompanying text.
14. II DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE UNIFICATION OF LAW GOVERNING THE IN-
TERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS-THE HAGUE, 2-25 APRIL 1964, at 26, 46 (1966) [here-
inafter II Diplomatic Conference]. For the origin of the debate, it is sufficient to
recall that the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law
("UNIDROIT"), the headquarters of which are in Rome, produced a draft in 1935
referred to as the "Rome draft," which required parties expressly to decide the law
that would apply to their contract in order to exclude the uniform law's application.
Id. at 46.
15. See infra notes 33-34, 66 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 34-36, 66-68 and accompanying text.
17. See id.
18. See infra notes 46, 62-65, 123-30 and accompanying text.
19. See id.
20. A contract of adhesion is defined as a
[s]tandardized contract form offered to consumers of goods and services on
essentially 'take it or leave it' basis without affording consumer[s] realistic
opportunity to bargain and under such conditions that consumer[s] cannot
obtain desired product or services except by acquiescing in form contract.
Distinctive feature of adhesion contract is that weaker party has no realistic
choice as to its terms.
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 38 (5th ed. 1979). An example of a contract of adhesion is
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trade usages2' that took advantage of merchants in developing
nations.2 2 Thus, the uniform laws attempted to balance the
principle of party autonomy with the need for protection of
merchants in developing nations.23
In 1930, the International Institute for the Unification of
Private Law ("UNIDROIT") 24 began drafting a convention to
unify law on the international sale of goods regarding the
rights and obligations of buyers and sellers.25 In 1956,
UNIDROIT issued a Draft Uniform Law on the International
Sale of Goods (the "1956 Draft"), which defined such rights
and obligations of buyers and sellers in the international sale
of goods.2 6
To compose the 1956 Draft, a special commission was
22
formed (the "Special Commission"),l which wanted to give
parties increased flexibility in formulating international con-
tracts .8 The Special Commission proposed an article that per-
when an individual goes to purchase a new automobile and he must sign a standard
form to consumate the contract of sale. This form is prepared by the manufacturer,
and the purchaser must take it or forego the sale even though he is dealing with an
independent dealer. J. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 6 (2d ed. 1977). "Dan-
gers are inherent in standardization, however, for it affords a means by which one
party may impose terms on another unwitting or even tnwilling party." E. FARNS-
WORTH, CONTRACTS 295 (1982).
21. A usage of trade is defined as "any practice or method of dealing having
such regularity of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify an expectation
that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question." U.C.C. § I-
205(2) (1978).
22. See infra notes 46, 62-65 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 36, 73-75 and accompanying text.
24. UNIDROIT examines methods for coordinating and harmonizing private
law between nations or groups of nations and prepares for various nations to pro-
gressively adopt uniform private legislation. LAW AND LEGAL INFORMATION DIREC-
TORY 55 (5th ed. 1988). UNIDROIT requested a committee of European scholars,
led by Professor Ernst Rabel, to prepare a draft of unification of sales laws in the
early 1930s. Posch, supra note I, at 5-6. World War II impeded the committee's
efforts. Id. At the end of hostilities, the scholars resumed their endeavors. Id. at 6.
25. J. HONNOLD, supra note 6, at 49.
26. II Diplomatic Conference, supra note 14, at 3.
27. Twenty-one nations convened at the Hague in 1951 where they instituted a
special commission (the "Special Commission") to prepare a revision of a draft uni-
form sales law, which was prepared by a committee of European scholars. Honnold,
The 1964 Hague Conventions and Uniform Laws on the International Sale of Goods, 13 AM. J.
COMP. L. 451 (1964). The draft uniform sales law was drafted in 1935 and subse-
quently revised and released in 1939. Id.; see supra note 14 (discussing the 1935
draft).
28. See II Diplomatic Conference, supra note 14, at 46. The Special Commission
did not want the Uniform Law to be obligatory on parties, because parties may want
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mitted parties to exclude the convention by designating the
municipal law that should apply either by express clause or
"necessary implication" from the contract's terms.29 Some
members of the Special Commission opposed this proposal,
urging that the article should permit exclusions to be deter-
mined by looking beyond the contract's terms to trade usages
and parties' conduct. °  The Special Commission rejected
these arguments and retained the language requiring contrac-
tual language that excluded the uniform law.'
The Special Commission circulated the 1956 Draft to na-
tions and the International Chamber of Commerce for com-
ment.12 The comments on the 1956 Draft exclusion provision
evidenced two divergent views regarding whether parties
could exclude the uniform law's application by implication to
enable them to apply their choice of law. Some nations, such
as Switzerland, claimed the provision gave a trial judge too
much discretion to decide when a contract excluded the uni-
form law. 3 Other nations, such as the Federal Republic of
Germany ("West Germany"), feared the provision required
to substitute a law that they feel is better suited to their contract's circumstances. Id.
at 30.
29. See id. at 7. Article 6 states, "[tihe parties may entirely exclude the applica-
tion of the present law provided that they indicate the municipal law to be applied to
their contract. Such indication must be an express term of the contract or arise by
necessary implication from its provisions." Id.
30. See id. at 46.
31. See id. at 31. To further eliminate misunderstandings between parties, the
Special Commission stated in its report that "[a] term merely specifying a particular
jurisdiction should not alone.., be regarded as excluding the Uniform Law." Id. at
46.
32. Tunc, Commentay on the lague Conventions of the 1st ofn Jly 1964 on International
Sale of Goods and the Formation of the Contract of Sale, in I DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON
THE UNIFICATION OF LAW GOVERNING THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODs-THE
HAGUE, 2-25 APRIL 1964, at 359 (1966) [hereinafter I DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE].
The International Chamber of Commerce was founded in Paris in June of 1920. See
Y.B. INT'L ORGANIZATIONS B 1490 (1985). It is an organization of world business that
aims to represent all international business's economic aspects, express and ascertain
decisions of those involved in international trade, promote free competition in world
trade, harmonize terminology and trade practices, improve business conditions and
solve international economic problems, encourage interaction and understandings
among various nations, and promote world peace. Id.
33. II Diplomatic Conference, supra note 14, at 175. Switzerland proposed that
article 6 should provide that "[t]he parties can totally exclude the operation of the
present Law provided that they expressly determine the municipal law which will be
applicable to their contract." Id. Switzerland found the words "or arise by necessary
implication from [the] provisions [of the contract]" to be unsatisfactory due to the
1989]
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that the uniform law apply even where the parties' previous
trade practices and dealings indicated otherwise.3 1 Other na-
tions objected to an express exclusion as a prerequisite of the
exclusion provision.3 5 In 1963, the Special Commission modi-
fied the 1956 Draft to try to resolve these concerns and to de-
velop a convention that would be ratified by nations. 6
This draft (the "1963 Draft")3 7 permitted express exclu-
sion but altered "necessary implication" to permit only those
exclusions that can be definitely ascertained by the contract's
provisions. 38  This provision enabled parties to exclude the
uniform law by either an express contractual provision or a
contract term that indicates their. intent to exclude.3 9 At the
Hague Meetings, which were convened to debate the 1963
Draft,40 the exclusion provision provoked further debate.4
Some nations were concerned that the language did not go far
enough to grant parties freedom in negotiating their con-
tracts.42 For example, the United Kingdom, Belgium, and
uncertainty it necessarily creates, because a judge will have to determine under what
circumstances the parties' choice of law is clearly indicated by the contract. Id.
34. See id. at 86. West Germany argued that article 6 in its present form did not
sufficiently protect the principle of freedom of contract. Id. West Germany feared
the uniform law's provisions would be applied to a contract despite the parties'
wishes. Id. Thus, West Germany wanted article 6 amended to further protect party
autonomy. Id. West Germany asserted that this principle corresponds to German
law, French law, and the law of many other nations. Id.
35. For example, Portugal asserted that "it is enough if the special rules to
which the parties wish to refer clearly follow from the provisions of the contract." Id.
at 144. Similarly, the Netherlands asserted it had no objections to the principles
provided for in the language of article 6. Id. at 137.
36. Tunc, supra note 32, at 359.
37. II Diplomatic Conference, supra note 14, at 213.
38. Id. art. 6, at 213. Article 6 states that
[t]he parties may entirely exclude the application of the present law
provided that they indicate the municipal law to be applied to their con-
tract.... The references, declarations or indications provided in the pre-
ceding paragraphs are to be subject of an express term or to clearly follow
from the provisions of the contract.
Id.
39. Id.
40. See Tunc, supra note 32, at 359. Through the initiative of the government of
the Netherlands, meetings were held at The Hague in April 1964 to discuss the 1963
draft. Id. Article 6 was discussed during the second meeting, which was held on
April 3, 1964. Records, Second Meeting (Apr. 3, 1964), in I Diplomatic Conference,
supra note 32, at 24-28.
41. I Diplomatic Conference, supra note 32, at 25-26, 40.
42. Id. at 26.
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Israel wanted to expand exclusions to include factors beyond
the contract's language.4" Other nations, UNIDROIT, and the
International Chamber of Commerce stated the language went
too far in permitting parties to exclude the uniform law.44
They argued that parties should be required to state expressly
what law was to apply to their contract and, if the parties failed
to state an alternative law, the uniform law should apply.45 Yu-
goslavia asserted that the paramount concern in drafting the
exclusion provision was party equality.46 The majority vote ap-
proved an amendment allowing exclusion by implication with-
out requiring that such exclusion be implied only from the
terms of the contract.47
The Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods (the
"ULIS") 4' as adopted in 1964 states, "[t]he parties to a con-
tract of sale shall be free to exclude the application thereto of
the present Law either entirely or partially. Such exclusion
may be express or implied."4 9 Simultaneously, a separate Uni-
form Law on the Formation of Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods (the "ULF") 50 was finalized in 1964 at the
43. Id. The United Kingdom stated that "there should be as much freedom as
possible for derogation from the Uniform Law. The British amendment allowed der-
ogations to be made expressly or impliedly, which seemed to be the best possible
formula." Id. Israel emphasized the importance of giving the principle of party au-
tonomy full effect. Id. Belgium proposed an amendment that "the Uniform Law
should state clearly that one can exclude the application of the Law either for all of its
provisions or for part of them" and that "the statement of conditions, under which
the exclusion of the Uniform Law was valid, should be omitted." Id. at 25. The
Belgian delegate stated that autonomy of intention should prevail in all cases. Id.
44. Id. at 25. Switzerland opposed the language of article 6 primarily because of
the complications it may cause for a judge. Id. Switzerland expressed similar con-
cerns in its comments on the 1956 draft. See supra note 33. UNIDROIT and the
International Chamber of Commerce both rejected the idea that parties could imply
a choice of law in order to exclude the uniform law. I Diplomatic Conference, supra
note 32, at 25-26.
45. Id. at 25.
46. Id. at 28.
47. Id. at 276. This amendment was adopted by a nearly split vote of 11 in
favor, 10 against, and three abstentions. Id.
48. Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods,
annex, Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, July 1, 1964, 834 U.N.T.S.
107 [hereinafter ULIS]. The 1964 ULIS came into force on August 18, 1972, six
months after it was ratified by five nations in accordance with article X(l). Id. at 109.
49. Id. at 123.
50. Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods, July 1, 1964, 834 U.N.T.S. 169 [hereinafter ULF). It
came into force on August 23, 1972, six months after the fifth nation ratified it as
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Hague Meetings. 5' The ULF provides that its provisions apply
unless parties expressly or impliedly agree to the application of
other rules.52
The 1964 ULIS and ULF are currently in force. 53 How-
ever, they have not been successful, because the number of
member nations is very limited and most are from Western Eu-
rope.54 Thus, neither convention has been successful in unify-
ing international law on the sale of goods.
B. Adoption of the Sale of Goods Convention
Due to the continuing desire for uniformity, the United
Nations established the United Nations Commission on Inter-
national Trade Law ("UNCITRAL")5 5 in 1965. UNCITRAL is
authorized to create a new uniform law for the international
required by article VIII(l). Id. at 171. The ULF was the result of UNIDROIT's ef-
forts to draft rules for the actual formation in the international sale of goods, which
began in 1951. Honnold, supra note 27, at 451.
51. ULF, supra note 50, at 169; seeJ. HONNOLD, supra note 6, at 49.
52. ULF, supra note 50, art. 2, at 187. Article 2 states, "[t]he provisions of the
following Articles shall apply except to the extent that it appears from the prelimi-
nary negotiations, the offer, the reply, the practices which the parties have estab-
lished between themselves or usage, that other rules apply." Id.
53. See supra notes 49-50.
54. Only nine nations have become members of the ULIS: Belgium, the Federal
Republic of Germany, Gambia, Great Britain, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, and San Marino. See Posch, supra note 1, at 6. The United States probably did
not adopt the 1964 ULIS because it feared that if a new statute solely controlling
international sale was presented at the same time as the Uniform Commercial Code,
the nationwide success of the Uniform Commercial Code would be impeded. See id.
In the United Kingdom, the ULIS was enacted as the Uniform Law on International
Sales Act of 1967, which entered into force in 1972. The Uniform Laws on Interna-
tional Sales Act, 1967, ch. 45; see Posch, supra note 1, at 6. Parties must expressly
adopt the law for it to apply. The Uniform Laws on International Sales Act, 1967, ch.
45; see Posch, supra note 1, at 6. However, no parties have adopted it. The Uniform
Laws on International Sales Act, 1967, ch. 45; see Posch, supra note I, at 6. Thus, it
can be disregarded in the realm of British law. d.
55. See Establishment of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, G.A.
Res. 2205, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 99, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), reprinted in
[1970] 1 Y.B. UNCITRAL 65-66, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1970. The United Na-
tions General Assembly adopted a 1965 Hungarian resolution requesting the estab-
lishment of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCI-
TRAL"). Id. The resolution provides for the participation of twenty-nine states,
elected by the General Assembly for a six-year term. Id. The General Assembly is
required to observe a distribution of seats for participation: seven from African
States, five from Asian States, four from Eastern European States, five from Latin
American States, and eight from Western European and other States. Id.
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sale of goods.5 6  UNCITRAL established a working group 57
that subsequently combined revisions of the ULIS and the
ULF, resulting in the Sale of Goods Convention.58
The United Kingdom had submitted a study it prepared
on the exclusion provision of the ULIS to the United Nations
Secretary-General during discussions on the ULIS text in
1971. 5' The study included comments by Tunisian and
Kenyan representatives, who acted as consultants to the
United Kingdom in the study's preparation.6 ° The study once
more portrayed divergent views on whether parties should be
permitted to exclude impliedly its application. These views
parallel those enumerated during discussions on the 1956 and
1963 drafts.6' The representative of Tunisia proposed that the
working group delete or modify the exclusion provision in the
ULIS.6 2 Tunisia argued there were two dangers inherent in
the retention of the provision.63 First, that in its present form
it permitted a strong party to "impose its will" on a weaker
party.64 Second, it defeats the goal that a uniform law have
uniform application.6 5
The United Kingdom responded in opposition to the rep-
resentative of Tunisia's arguments by emphasizing that inter-
national trade is based upon free negotiations and the princi-
ple of freedom of contract should be retained.6" The United
56. Id.; seeJ. HONNOLD, supra note 6, at 49-50.
57. See Honnold, The Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods:
An Overview, 27 AM.J. CoMP. L. 223, 225 (1979). The Working Group was comprised
of a cross-section of the Commission's members. Id.
58. Id. at 226. This task was completed in nine annual sessions. Id.
59. Analysis of Comments and Proposals Relating to Article 1-1 7 of the Uniform Law on
International Sale of Goods (ULIS) 1964: Note by the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/WG.2/WP.6 (1970) [hereinafter ULIS Analysis], reprinted in [1971] 2 Y.B.
UNCITRAL 37, 43, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1971.
60. Id.
61. See supra notes 27-49 and accompanying text.
62. See ULIS Analysis, supra note 59, reprinted in [1971] 2 Y.B. UNCITRAL at 43.
Tunisia's representative did not want parties to be able to modify necessary elements
of the contract that the Uniform Law explicitly enumerated. See id.
63. See id. at 43-44.
64. See id. at 44.
65. See id.
66. See id. Tunisia, on the other hand, felt the principle of party autonomy had
lost its significance in recent years because all nations' economic systems intervene in
individuals' relations. The individuals only freedom is to enter contracts that adhere
to nation's economic and financial rules. Id. at 43-44.
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Kingdom did not believe it would be unjust to the weaker party
if the uniform law were substituted by the stronger party's law,
"since every national law attempted to strike an equitable bal-
ance between the rights of the buyer and those of the seller." 67
The United Kingdom's report suggested that the present lan-
guage of the ULIS exclusion provision be retained, and Kenya
agreed.6 8
In April 1980, sixty-two nations participated in the United
Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods in Vienna, where the Sale of Goods Convention was
adopted. 69 On January 1, 1988, it entered into force in mem-
ber nations. 70 The Sale of Goods Convention contains certain
provisions that are choice of law rules. 7' Article 6 permits par-
ties to exclude its application to their contract in order that
they may choose the law to apply to their transactions. 72 De-
spite the fact that the working group's draft convention elicited
the same opposing views regarding exclusion, the committee
decided to make no substantive changes in the draft.73 The
final language of article 6 is as follows: "[t]he parties may ex-
clude the application of this Convention or, subject to article
12, derogate from or vary the effect of any of its provisions. '74
By deleting references to express and implied exclusion, UN-
CITRAL adopted ambiguous language as a compromise to
these opposing views. This language revived the long-stand-
ing debate over the means by which parties may exclude the
uniform law.75
67. Id. at 44.
68. Id.
69. See Sale of Goods Convention, supra note 2, 19 I.L.M. at 669.
70. See supra note 3.
71. See Sale of Goods Convention, supra note 2, arts. I(I)(a), 6, 95, S. Doc. No.
9, at 22-23, 25, 52 Fed. Reg. at 6264-65, 6278, 19 I.L.M. at 672-73, 693; see also Recent
Developments-International Trade-Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods, Dec. 22, 1986, 28 HARV. INT'L L.J. 526, 534 n.73 (1987).
72. Sale of Goods Convention, supra note 2, art. 6, S. Doc. No. 9, at 23, 52 Fed.
Reg. at 6265, 19 I.L.M. at 673.
73. Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the Work of
its Tenth Session, 32 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17), U.N. Doc. A/32/17 40, 50 (1977)
[hereinafter International Trade Report] reprinted in 1977] 8 Y.B. UNCITRAL 11, 29,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1977.
74. Sale of Goods Convention, supra note 2, art. 6, S. Doc. No. 9, at 23, 52 Fed.
Reg. at 6265, 19 I.L.M. at 673.
75. See supra notes 14-49 and accompanying text.
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II. IMPLIED EXCLUSION. A PROPOSED SOLUTION TO
ACHIEVE UNIFORM APPLICATION OF THE SALE
OF GOODS CONVENTION
It would be deplorable if the nations should, after protracted negotia-
tions, reach agreement ... and that their several courts should then
disagree as to the meaning of what they appeared to agree upon.
Viscount Simonds of the British House of Lords
76
A. Certainty in Article 6 is Required
The overall purpose of the Sale of Goods Convention is to
achieve its uniform application.77 Consistent interpretations
are critical to the success of all uniform laws. 78  However,
courts have noted that conflicting interpretations' of uniform
laws exist.79 The language of article 6 can be inconsistently
interpreted as either requiring express, written exclusion of
the Sale of Goods Convention or permitting exclusions to be
implied by conduct. 80 The language of article 6 strikes a bal-
ance between the drafters' opposing positions.8' While the
compromise language enabled parties to sign the Sale of
Goods Convention, it now threatens the uniform law's ultimate
success.
8 2
76. Scruttons Ltd. v. Midland Silicones Ltd., 1962 App. Cas. 446, 471 (1961).
77. See Sale of Goods Convention, supra note 2, art. 7(1), S. Doc. No. 9, at 23, 52
Fed. Reg. at 6265, 19 I.L.M. at 673.
78. See Sturley, supra note 8, at 729; Sale of Goods Convention, supra note 2, art.
7(l), S. Doc. No. 9, at 23, 52 Fed. Reg. at 6265, 19 I.L.M. at 673. Article 7(1) states,
"[in the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had . . . to the need to
promote uniformity in its application . I..." Id  Article 7(1) is acclaimed as the most
basic provision of the Sale of Goods Convention. J. HONNOLD, supra note 6, at 60.
79. See, e.g., General Motors Overseas Operation v. S.S. Goettingen, 225 F. Supp.
902, 904-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). General Motors involved actions for liability for cargo
damage. The court acknowledged conflicts between German and U.S. interpreta-
tions of the term "peril of the sea" derived from the Brussels Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading (the "Hague Rules").
Id. at 904. Under German law, a peril of the sea does not have to be an extraordinary
event. Id. at 905. However, American law regarding peril of the sea emphasizes un-
foreseeability, which would not free a carrier from liability as readily as German law.
Id.; see also TWA v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 257-58 & n.31 (1984) (observ-
ing nations' conflicts of interpretation of the Warsaw Convention); Chowdhury v.
Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, 1970 Pak. Legal Dec. (Sup. Ct.) 373, 392-93, [1970] 2 Lloyd's
Rep. 272, 282 (Pak.) (observing conflicts of interpretation of the Hague Rules).
80. See infra notes 95-99, 118-22 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 59-75 and accompanying text.
82. See Rosett, Critical Reflections on the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
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Because of the ambiguous language of article 6, nations
may interpret it in accordance with principles of their own na-
tional statutes.8 3 This has occurred previously with ambiguous
language in other international agreements 4.8  For example,
West Germany and the United States differ in their interpreta-
tion of protection for third parties under the Brussels Conven-
tion for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to
Bills of Lading (the "Hague Rules").8 5 On the one hand, West
Germany has indicated it will not require a contract clause to
grant third parties the Hague Rule's benefits because of its do-
mestic law's principles.86 On the other hand, the United States
relies on its own laws to prohibit the Hague Rules from pro-
tecting third parties unless the bill of lading contains an ex-
plicit clause stating this that satisfies contract requirements.8 7
International Sale of Goods, 45 OHIo ST. L.J. 265, 270-71 (1984). A problem with the
Sale of Goods Convention is that the delegates did not reach agreement on its terms
by consensus but rather by compromise. See id. at 270. Compromise merely entails
the formulation of a unified statement of rules, which are subject to divergent under-
standings and leave the interpreter "at sea without [an] anchor." Id.
83. See Sturley, supra note 8, at 733. Permissible interpretations of a uniform law
may be: totally consistent with the nation's laws, entirely inconsistent with the na-
tion's laws, or partially inconsistent with the nation's domestic laws. See id. at 744. A
court will generally utilize the interpretation that is consistent with their domestic
rules. See id.
84. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
85. Aug. 25, 1924, 51 Stat. 233, T.S. No. 931, at 18, 120 L.N.T.S. 155 [hereinaf-
ter Hague Rules]. The Hague Rules sought to create a uniform law for allocating
responsibilities for cargo losses. See generally id. Article 4(2) and 4(5) provide for
limitations and exemptions from liabilities for "the carrier" and "the ship" when
cargo is lost. Id. arts. 4(2), (5), 51 Stat. at 251-52, T.S. No. 931, at 22-24, 120
L.N.T.S. at 167-68. The Hague Rules are ambiguous as to how far a carrier's protec-
tion can be extended to protect third parties. See Sturley, supra note 8, at 748. They
are also ambiguous as to the validity of clauses providing that the carrier's defenses
apply to third parties performing the carrier's contractual obligations, which are
commonly included in carriers' bills of lading. See id. at 748-49.
86. Judgment of July 7, 1960, Bundesgerichtshof, GRSZ, W. Ger., 14 Monats-
schrift fir Deutsches Recht [M.D.R.] 907. This judgment held that parties to a con-
tract could exclude a third party's future liability for negligence by implication. Id.
This decision was based on the West German principle that an exclusion clause's
purpose is material, not its terms. Id. at 907-08. Relying on this decision, the West
German court subsequently treated the master of a vessel's entitlement to the limita-
tion of a carrier's liability as a firmly grounded principle. See Judgment of Jan. 21,
1971, Bundesgerichtshof, GRSZ, W. Ger., 25 M.D.R. 462, 462-63; Sturley, supra note
8, at 771. In West Germany, a third party can always rely on a clause in a bill of
lading due to section 328 of the German Civil Code, which permits a contract to
stipulate performance for a third party's benefit, and enables the third party to de-
mand such performance. BUJRGERLICHES GESETZBUCn [BGB] § 328(1) (W. Ger.).
87. See Robert C. Herd & Co. v. Krawill Mach. Corp., 359 U.S. 297, 302 (1959).
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Nations have made other interpretations of the Hague Rules
based on their domestic laws.""
Signatory nations may use their own national statutes as a
guide in interpreting article 6.89 For example, the United
States has indicated that parties are bound to the Sale of
Goods Convention unless they "have left their contracts silent
as to applicable law." 9 ° Most likely, the United States will in-
terpret article 6 in conformity with the Uniform Commercial
Code, which permits implied exclusions." ' However, Yugosla-
via will probably interpret article 6 to require express exclu-
sions, because Yugoslavia's primary concern in drafting an ex-
clusion provision is party equality. 2 Thus, depending on the
forum, the supposedly uniform law might or might not apply.
This is exactly the result the Sale of Goods Convention aimed
to avoid. 3
In Krawill, the U.S. Supreme Court strongly suggested that an agent's liability could
be limited by a bill of lading relying implicitly on the recognition by the United States
of the principle of third party beneficiaries. Id. at 303. The Court also relied on two
other domestic law principles. Id. at 302-04. First, that an agent is liable for his
negligent actions. Id. at 304. Second, the principle that a rule of law that derogates
from the common law should be strictly construed. Id. The Court did this even
though it recognized the Hague Rules' purpose of uniformity. Id. at 301.
88. See, e.g., Miles Int'l Corp. v. Federal Commerce & Navigation Co., [1978] 1
Lloyd's Rep. 285 (Que. Super. Ct. 1977) (Quebec law recognizing a third party's
right to assert a carrier's limitation of liability due to Article 1029 of the Quebec Civil
Code, which expressly permits contracts for the benefit of third parties). The New
York Star v. Salmond & Spraggon, [19811 1 W.L.R. 138, 143-44 (P.C.) (English law
allowing third party to receive Hague Rule's protections, but only if a clause in the
bill of lading is drafted to satisfy highly technical domestic rules).
89. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
90. Pfund, supra note 4, at 6262.
91. U.C.C. § 1-105(1) (1978). The language of section 1-105 is as follows:
(1) Except as provided hereafter in this section, when a transaction
bears a reasonable relation to this state and also to another state or nation
the parties may agree that the law either of this state or of such other state
or nation shall govern their rights and duties. Failing such agreement this
Act applies to transactions bearing an appropriate relation to this state.
Id. It has been argued that section 1-105 permits implied exclusions of its terms. See
Neville Chem. Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 422 F.2d 1205, 1211 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 826 (1970); Dore & DeFranco, supra note 6, at 53.
92. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
93. Sale of Goods Convention, supra note 2, art. 7(l), S. Doc. No. 9, at 23, 52
Fed. Reg. at 6265, 19 I.L.M. at 673. Article 7(1) states, "[iun the interpretation of this
Convention, regard is to be had ... to the need to promote uniformity in its applica-
tion." Id.
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B. Arguments in Favor of Implied Exclusions
Since the earliest efforts to draft a uniform law, nations
have disagreed on whether parties should be able to opt out
implicitly of the uniform law's application.94 Article 6 of the
Sale of Goods Convention is no exception. Because the Sale
of Goods Convention recently entered into force, article 6 has
not yet been interpreted by courts. However, some legal
scholars have interpreted article 6 to permit implied exclusions
based on analyses of the language of article 6, the draft com-
mentary, and negotiations.95
Proponent's of implied exclusion assert that the plain lan-
guage of article 6 indicates that implied exclusions should be
permitted, because the drafters of the Sale of Goods Conven-
tion's text would have included the word "expressed" if it was
their intention to allow only for explicit exclusions. 96 They as-
sert that the drafter's intent of deleting the word "implied"
from the ULIS to the Sale of Goods Convention was to allow
courts to decide clearly and carefully that an exclusion has oc-
curred, whether such exclusion was made by explicit or im-
plicit agreement.97 The draft commentary provides the basis
for this assertion because it states that the special "reference to
'implied' exclusion might encourage courts to conclude, on in-
sufficient grounds, that the Convention had been wholly ex-
cluded."9 8 Further, during discussions of the Sale of Goods
Convention, the drafting committee rejected two proposals
disallowing "mere implication" and requiring express agree-
ments .9
94. See supra note 14.
95. See Dore & DeFranco, supra note 6, at 53-54.
96. SeeJ. HONNOLD, supra note 6, at 106; S. SCHLECTRIEM, UNIFORM SALES LAW:
THE UN-CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 35
(1986); Note, Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: Applicability of the United Nations
Convention, supra note 6, at 235-39.
97. See S. SCHLECTRIEM, supra note 96, at 35; see also Note, supra note 6, at 235-
39.
98. Cornmentar. on the Draft on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Prepared by
the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 97/15, at 44, reprinted in Official Records of the United
Nations on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 97/19, at 17;
see SCHLECTRIEM, supra note 96, at 35.
99. International Trade Report, supra note 73, at 50, reprinted in [ 1977] 8 Y.B. UNCI-
TRAL at 29. A proposal was made that "mere implication" should not suffice to set
aside the Convention, thus, it can only be excluded by the parties express stipulation.
Id. Another proposal was made that the parties must expressly choose a law to sub-
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Several policy arguments can be made in favor of implied
exclusions. First, due to the continuing development of trade
law, the drafters of the Sale of Goods Convention left gaps in
the provisions to be filled in accordance with the needs and
practices of trade law.' 00 Permitting implied exclusions com-
plies with current trends in trade law.' 0 ' For example, the re-
quirement of an express clause is against current practices in
the area of unprocessed products and raw materials.0 2 Model
contracts for the sale of unprocessed products and raw materi-
als contain a clause stating the competent jurisdiction to hear
disputes arising out of the contract.'0 3 Under current prac-
tices, this clause implies that the parties intended to choose the
law of that jurisdiction to apply to their contract.10 4
Further, there is a trend in national and international
codifications toward giving parties to a contract unlimited lib-
erty to choose the law they wish to apply to their transactions,
due in part to nation's acceptance of the principle of party au-
tonomy. 0 5 The following is an example of a national law that
follows this trend. Section 1-105 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, as it is applied in most states of the United States, allows
parties to make an agreement as to their choice of law, thereby
excluding the Uniform Commercial Code's application. 0 6 In
theUnited States, courts may interpret section 1-105 to permit
parties to use implied agreements as to the applicable law.' 0 7
stitute for the Sale of Goods Convention in order to successfully exclude it. Id.
These proposals were opposed because "it may be perfectly clear that the parties do
not wish the Convention to apply even though this intention was not stated ex-
pressly." Id.
100. J. HONNOLD, supra note 6, at 127-28.
101. See Pelichet, Report on the Law Applicable to International Sales of Goods, in
HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw, ACTES ET DOCUMENTS 19, 59
(1987).
102. Id. at 65.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 59. This principle was promoted by many countries during discus-
sions on the ULIS and the Sale of Goods Convention. See supra notes 34, 66-68 and
accompanying text.
106. U.C.C. § 1-105 (1978).
107. Dore & DeFranco, supra note 6, at 53; see, e.g., Neville Chem. Co. v. Union
Carbide Corp., 422 F.2d 1205, 1211 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970) (rely-
ing on U.C.C. 1-105 in finding no dispute that the parties contemplated that Penn-
sylvania law would apply); In re Bengston, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 283, 289 (D. Conn.
1965) (noting that "the meaning of the agreement of the parties is to be determined
1989]
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The following recent international codifications also evi-
dence a trend toward permitting implied exclusions. The 1986
Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods (the "1986 Choice of Law Con-
vention")'o8 gives parties to an international sale of goods con-
tract the freedom to choose the law governing their transaction
if their agreement on the applicable law is "express" or
"clearly demonstrated" by the contract's terms and the parties'
conduct.'0 9 The Convention on the Law Applicable to Con-
tractual Obligations (the "Rome Convention of 1980")"I0 pro-
vides that the parties' choice of law will govern as long as their
choice is "expressed" or "demonstrated with reasonable cer-
tainty."
Proponents of implied exclusion interpret the draft com-
mentary as requiring courts to determine with certainty that
there was an exclusion." 2 This interpretation of article 6 al-
lowing implied exclusions in conjunction with the draft com-
mentary may satisfy countries, such as Tunisia, that were op-
posed to implied exclusions, because they feared adhesion
contracts and a stronger party's domination.' '3 A certainty re-
by the language used by them and by their action, read and interpreted in light of
commercial practices and other surrounding circumstances").
108. Draft Convention on the Law Applicable to Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods, Dec. 22, 1986 [hereinafter Choice of Law Convention], reprinted in 24
I.L.M. 1575 (1985). This Convention provides choice of law rules for international
commercial transactions. See Galliard, Introductory Note, Hague Conference on Private In-
ternational Law [Conference], Draft Convention on the Law Applicable to Contracts for the Inter-
national Sale of Goods, 24 I.L.M. 1573-74 (1985). The 1986 Choice of Law Convention
was drafted as a revision of the 1955 Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to the
International Sale of Goods and a supplement to the United Nations Convention on
Sales. Id. at 1573. Delegates from all parts of the world participated in the Hague
Conference on Private International Law. Id. at 1574. The Draft Convention will go
into effect when five countries ratify it. Choice of Law Convention, supra, art. 27(1),
reprinted in 24 I.L.M. at 1578.
109. Choice of Law Convention, supra note 108, art. 7(1), reprinted in 24 I.L.M. at
1575.
110. OJ. L 266 (1980) [hereinafter Rome Convention of 1980] (an agreement
between the Member States of the European Economic Community).
I 11. Id. art. 3(1), at 2. Article 3(1) states:
A contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties. The choice
must be expressed or demonstrated with reasonable certainty by the terms
of the contract or the circumstances of the case. By their choice the parties
can select the law applicable to the whole or a part only of the contract.
Id.
11 2. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
113. Id,
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quirement on the arbitrator's or court's part protects a weak
party from having a stronger party's will imposed upon it, be-
cause simple indications or fictitious intentions would be insuf-
ficient to satisfy such a requirement.' 14 This interpretation
would require nations, such as the United Kingdom, that
wanted implied exclusions without restrictions," 5 to compro-
mise by having to fulfill the certainty requirement.
In addition, because of potential consumer vulnerability,
other conventions require an express writing requirement
when contracting with consumers.'16 This is not a concern in
the Sale of Goods Convention, because consumer sales are ex-
cluded from its application." 7 Merchants, it is argued, are
deemed to be sophisticated enough and to have sufficiently
equal bargaining power to be without need of the protection
afforded by a requirement of express exclusion."' 8
III. EXPRESS EXCLUSIONS: THE BETTER
TO PROMOTE UNIFORMITY
The Sale of Goods Convention's ultimate goal is to create
a uniform law to promote and strengthen international
trade." 9 Permitting implied exclusions will result in uncer-
tainty in the convention's application. Proponents of express
exclusions assert that implied agreements are insufficient to
exclude the Sale of Goods Convention, because the plain lan-
guage of article 6 does not provide for implied exclusions as
the ULIS did.'1 0 Unlike the proponents of implied exclusions,
they interpret the draft commentary as the drafter's clear as-
sertion that implied exclusions do not satisfy the Convention's
requirements.' 2 ' Further, the drafting committee rejected the
United Kingdom's proposal that article 6 state that such exclu-
sion, derogation or variation may be express or implied. 122 If
114. Pelichet, supra note 101, at 67.
115. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
116. Pelichet, supra note 101, at 67.
117. See Sale of Goods Convention, supra note 2, art. 2, S. Doc. No. 9, at 22, 52
Fed. Reg. at 6264, 19 I.L.M. at 672.
118. See Pelichet, supra note 101, at 67.
119. J. HONNOLD, supra note 6, at 47.
120. See Dore & DeFranco, supra note 6, at 53-54.
121. Id.
122. See Analysis of Comments and Proposals by Governments and International Organiza-
lions on the Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, and on Draft
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UNCITRAL had wanted implied exclusions, it would have ex-
pressly provided for them.
Both the increase in the number of participants and the
diversity of the participants involved in the drafting of the Sale
of Goods Convention explain the deletion of the word "im-
plied" from the ULIS language in the Sale of Goods Conven-
tion. 12  In the late 1920s, the initial participants in the unifica-
tion effort were capitalist, industrialized Western European
governments with common economic and cultural exper-
iences. 24  By the early 1950s, Japan, the United States, and
several Latin American nations were also participating in the
efforts to draft a convention. 25 Despite the fact that the diver-
sity increased, the resulting ULIS, which permits implied ex-
clusions, was adopted primarily by Western European na-
tions. 12 16 When UNCITRAL took over the project, the number
of participants expanded from twenty to sixty-two. 27 A broad-
based membership was created, which was comprised of na-
tions with socialist as well as capitalist economies, and develop-
ing nations participated alongside industrialized nations. 128
While concerns of inequality were expressed in the earlier con-
Provisions Concerning Implementation, Reservations and Other Final Clauses Prepared by the
Secretary General, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 97/9, at 6; International Trade Report, supra note
73, at 50, reprinted in [1977] 8 Y.B. UNCITRAL at 29.
123. See infra notes 124-31 and accompanying text.
124. Rosett, supra note 82, at 267-68. The original committee was comprised of
Mr. H. Capitant (France), Dr. E. Rabel (Germany), Sir Cecil J.B. Hurst (Great Brit-
ain), President, Judge A. Bagge (Sweden), Mr. M. Fehr (Sweden). Honnold, A Uni-
form Law for International Sales, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 299, 302 n.5 (1959).
125. See Rabel, The Hague Conference on the Unification of Sales Law, I AM.J. CoMP.
L. 58 (1952). The following countries sent delegations or observors to an interna-
tional conference convened at the Hague to discuss the draft: Austria, Belgium, Bo-
livia, Chile, Cuba, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Ire-
land, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, San Marino,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United States, Vatican City and Yugoslavia. Id. The
United States and five other, countries were represented by observors. Id.
126. Posch, supra note 1, at 6. The following nations have become members of
the ULIS: Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Gambia, Great Britain, Israel,
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and San Marino. Id.
127. See Sale of Goods Convention, supra note 2, 19 I.L.M. at 669 (listing the
sixty-two nations that participated in the Conference on the Sale of Goods Conven-
tion); see also Rosett, supra note 82, at 268.
128. See Rosett, supra'note 82, at 268. "The broader membership now includes
states with socialist, centrally planned economies, as well as capitalistic, free market
economies; representatives of less developed nations fron the 'southern' half of the
world participate alongside representatives of the industrialized 'North.' " Id.
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ventions, 129 the Western European governments with common
trade experiences and little fear of inequality dominated the
legal thought. However, the need for equality was more ap-
parent in the drafting of the Sale of Goods Convention, be-
cause the influence of the developing nations increased. 3 "
Thus, the language permitting implied exclusions was de-
leted,' 3 ' further evidencing that the convention wished to re-
quire express exclusions.
Although there is merit to the policy arguments for im-
plied exclusions, the policy arguments for express exclusions
are stronger. First, article 7(1) of the Sale of Goods Conven-
tion states that "the observance of good faith in international
trade" is an indispensable tool in interpreting its provisions. 132
Although the Sale of Goods Convention does not define good
faith, the term has elsewhere been interpreted to mean "hon-
esty in fact" and "observance of reasonable commercial stan-
dards of fair dealing in the trade."'' 33 Fair dealing in trade re-
quires article 6 to be interpreted as mandating express exclu-
sion of its terms, because otherwise a more sophisticated party
can take advantage of an unsophisticated party that is unaware
of current trade practices. 134
Second, the argument that merchants under the Sale of
Goods Convention do not need an express writing require-
ment's protection because such a writing requirement should
only be imposed in conventions pertaining to consumers 13 5 is
not persuasive. The Convention on the Law' Applicable to
129. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
130. See Rosett, supra note 82, at 268.
131. Sale of Goods Convention, supra note 2, art. 6, S. Doc. No. 9, at 23, 52 Fed.
Reg. at 6265, 19 I.L.M. at 673.
132. Sale of Goods Convention, supra note 2, art. 7(1), S. Doc. No. 9, at 23, 52
Fed. Reg. at 6265, 19 I.L.M. at 673. Article 7(l) states: "In the interpretation of this
Convention, regard is to be had to its international character and to the need to
promote uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith in interna-
tional trade." Id.
133. See U.C.C. § 2-103 (1978). The Uniform Commercial Code's requirement
of good faith is broader than the Sale of Goods.Convention's requirement, because it
applies to parties' performance. J. HONNOLD, supra note 6, at 123-24. Section 1-203
of the Uniform Commercial Code provides that "[e]very contract or duty within this
Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement." U.C.C.
§ 1-203 (1978).
134. See ULIS Analysis, supra note 59, reprinted in [1971] 2 Y.B. UNCITRAL at 43-
44.
135. See Pelichet, supra note 101, at 67.
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Certain Consumer Sales' 36 provides that a parties' choice of
law "must be express and in writing."'' 37 The prohibition of
implied choices of law was due to the fear of the "economically
stronger and more ingenious seller" controlling the con-
tract.' 38 Similarly, a less sophisticated merchant should be af-
forded the same protection as the economically weaker and
less ingenious consumer because their plight is synony-
mous.' 3 9 Further, consumer contracts were excluded from the
Sale of Goods Convention's application for two reasons. 40
First, international consumer purchases are not common and
mostly concern mail order businesses and tourists.' 4 ' Second,
the drafters wanted to ensure that domestic consumer-protec-
tion laws were not minimized by the Sale of Goods Conven-
tion. 14 2 In excluding consumer contracts, the drafters aimed
to afford consumers more protection than the Sale of Goods
Convention offered. Thus, the drafters were not asserting that
merchants did not need any protection.
Article 7(2) states that questions on matters governed by
the Sale of Goods Convention that are not expressly deter-
mined by it should be determined in acquiescence with general
136. 19 I.L.M. 1516 (1980) [hereinafter Consumer Sales Convention].
137. Consumer Sales Convention, supra note 136, art. 6, at 1516. Article 6 pro-
vides:
The internal law chosen by the parties shall govern a contract to which the
Convention applies. However, a choice of law made by the parties shall in
no case deprive the consumer the protection afforded by the mandatory
rules of the internal law of the country in which he had his habitual resi-
dence at the time the order was given. The choice of law must be express
and in writing.
Id.
138. See Matic, Law Applicable to International Sales Hague Conventions and Yugoslav
Private International Law, in HAGUE-ZAGREB ESSAYS 4, at 26 (1983).
Instead of the implied choice of law by the parties, which has "unambigu-
ously" . . . resulted from the terms and provisions of the contract, the choice
of law for consumer sales must be express and in writing. The fear of the supe-
rior legal skill of the economically stronger and more ingenious seller has
undoubtedly influenced the experts to adopt that attitude ....
Id. (emphasis in original).
139. See ULIS Analysis, supra note 59, reprinted in [ 1971] 2 Y.B. UNCITRAL at 43-
44.
140. Sale of Goods Convention, supra note 2, art. 2, S. Doc. No. 9, at 22, 52 Fed.
Reg. at 6264, 19 I.L.M. at 672; see also S. SC-LECTRIEM, supra note 96, at 28.
141. See S. SCHLECTRIEM, supra note 96, at 28.
142. Id.
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principles underlying the convention.' 43 Freedom of contract
is an underlying principle.' 44 This theme is exemplified by ar-
ticle 6, which allows parties not only to exclude the Conven-
tion but also "vary the effect" of its provisions.' 45 Article 6
enables parties to shape their own agreements.' 4 6 Requiring
an express writing to exclude the Sale of Goods Convention is
consistent with this principle, because the parties are still free
to opt out of the convention's application completely and vary
the effect of its provisions as they desire.'4 7 By requiring an
express decision to exclude part or all of the Sale of Goods
Convention, parties to a contract will be in control of the terms
of that contract, unfettered by the possibility of subsequent in-
terpretations of a court.'4 8 Additionally, express exclusions,
because of their characteristic clarity, are consistent with an-
other overriding principle, that of fairness. "9 Thus, requiring
an express writing promotes two general principles of the Sale
of Goods Convention mandated by article 7(2). ' -'
The drafters of the Sale of Goods Convention left gaps in
the provisions to be filled in accordance with the needs and
practices of trade law.' 5 ' Although, the current trend in rela-
tion to the international uniform laws on sales appears to be
toward party autonomy, it is, in reality, a trend in form rather
than in substance. 5 2 The ULIS expressly states that the par-
ties' exclusion of its terms may be express or implied.' 53 How-
143. Sale of Goods Convention, supra note 2, art. 7(2), S. Doc. No. 9, at 23, 52
Fed. Reg. at 6265, 19 I.L.M. at 673.
144. See Posch, supra note 1, at 9. The Sale of Goods Convention "fully recog-
nizes the principle of freedom of contract. The parties to an international contract
for the sale of goods may reject the application of the Convention and agree on the
applicability of a national substantive law of sales, or of some general conditions and
trade usages." Id.
145. See Sale of Goods Convention, supra note 2, S. Doc. No. 9, at 23, 52 Fed.
Reg. at 6265, 19 I.L.M. at 673.
146. Id.
147. Sale of Goods Convention, supra note 2, art. 6, S. Doc. No. 9, at 23, 52 Fed.
Reg. at 6265, 19 I.L.M. at 673.
148. See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
149. Sale of Goods Convention, supra note 2, art. 7(1), S. Doc. No. 9, at 23, 52
Fed. Reg. at 6265, 19 I.L.M. at 673.
150. See Sale of Goods Convention, supra note 2, art. 7(2), S. Doc. No. 9, at 23-
24, 52 Fed. Reg. at 6265, 19 I.L.M. at 673.
151. SeeJ. HONNOLD, supra note 6, at 70-71, 127-28.
152. See infra notes 153-56 and accompanying text.
153. ULIS, supra note 48, 834 U.N.T.S. at 123. The ULIS states, "[t]he parties
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ever, in Landgericht Landshut,'54 the court decided that the ULIS
applied to a Dutch-German international sale contract even
though the contract stated that German law applied. 55 This
court required that when an international sale contract con-
tains a choice of law clause declaring that a nation's law gov-
erns, and that nation is a party to the ULIS, the contract must
not only state the choice of law expressly but also state that the
ULIS does not apply expressly.' 56 Furthermore, this trend ex-
ists in international conventions promulgated and ratified in
developed nations. 5 7 For example, both the ULIS and the
Rome Convention of 1980 permit implied exclusions.' 58  How-
ever, neither convention has been ratified by the diverse group
of nations that have ratified the Sale of Goods Convention. 159
to a contract of sale shall be free to exclude the application thereto of the present
[I]aw either entirely or partially. Such exclusion may be express or implied." Id.
154. Landgericht Landshut, 144 NJW 2032, 2033 (1976).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See infra notes 163-66 and accompanying text.
158. ULIS, supra note 48, 834 U.N.T.S. at 123; Rome Convention of 1980, supra
note 110, art. 3(1), at 2.
159. See Rome Convention of 1980, supra note 110 (an agreement between the
Member States of the European Economic Community); Rosett, supra note 82, at
268. The Rome Convention of 1980 cannot be adequately compared to the Sale of
Goods Convention for three reasons. First, the Rome Convention of 1980 is an
agreement between members of the European Economic Community, which are
more on par with each other than the signatories of the Sale of Goods Convention.
See Rome Convention of 1980, supra note 110. The basic purpose of the European
Community
is to bring about the merging of the essential economic interests of the
member countries through the gradual establishment and maintenance of
common markets involving the elimination of all barriers to the free move-
ment of goods, persons, services and capital and the adoption of common
policies; beyond the attainment of economic and social objectives, [the ulti-
mate goal is] political integration.
SCHIAVONE, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 91 (1983). 12 Member States currently
comprise the EEC: Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, France,
Great Britain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and
Spain. Treaty Between the Member States of the European Communities and the
Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic to the European Economic Commu-
nity and to the European Atomic Energy Community, O.J. L 302/9 (1985). Second,
the drafters of the Rome Convention of 1980 unambiguously provided for implied
exclusions. Rome Convention of 1980, supra note 110, art. 3(1), at 2. Third,
although article 3(1) of the Rome Convention of 1980 allows parties' choice of law to
be "expressed" or "demonstrated with reasonable certainty," this must be read with
articles 3(3) and 7(2), which provide that the parties' choice may be disregarded com-
pletely. Rome Convention of 1980, supra note 110, art. 3(3), at 2. Article 3(3) states:
The fact that the parties have chosen a foreign law, whether or not accompa-
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Similarly, trends in national laws are not significant because,
unlike the Sale of Goods Convention, they do not address the
concerns of the developing nations.
The desire for simplicity and certainty induced the move-
ment toward legal unification. 60 Allowing implied exclusions
creates uncertainty in the Sale of Goods Convention's applica-
tion, because the judge is given unlimited discretion to decide
on a case-by-case basis whether an exclusion occurred.' 6' This
defeats the desire for certainty because parties will be unsure
of whether they adequately excluded the Sale of Goods Con-
vention until a judge makes a determination. Requiring an ex-
press exclusion does not hinder the need for simplicity, be-
cause parties can exclude the Sale of Goods Convention's ap-
plication by simply stating that it does not apply. Model
contracts currently used can expressly exclude the Sale of
Goods Convention by using a stamp or annexed rider. 16 2
Uniform rules require nations of the world to compro-
mise. An interpretation requiring express exclusions is a com-
promise between the two opposing extremes of having no uni-
nied by the choice of a foreign tribunal, shall not, where all other elements
relevant to the situation at the time of the choice are connected with one
country only, prejudice the application of rules of the law of that country
which cannot be derogated from by contract, hereinafter called "mandatory
rules".
Id. Article 7(2) provides "[niothing in this Convention shall restrict the application
of the rules of the law of the forum in a situation where they are mandatory irrespec-
tive of the law otherwise applicable to the contract." Id. art. 7(2), at 3-4.
160. See Posch, supra note 1, at 5; see also Ronald Reagan's Letter of Transmittal,
II PUB. PAPERS 1316, 1317 (1983). President Reagan stated:
International trade now is subject to serious legal uncertainties. Questions
often arise as to whether our law or foreign law governs the transaction, and
our traders and their counsel find it difficult to evaluate and answer claims
based on one or another of the many unfamiliar foreign legal systems. The
Convention's uniform rules offer effective answers to these problems.
Enhancing legal certainty for international sales contracts will serve the
interests of all parties engaged in commerce by facilitating international
trade.
Id.
161. II Diplomatic Conference, supra note 14, at 175. Switzerland felt that per-
mitting implied exclusions gave a trial judge too much discretion to decide on a case
by case basis when a contract excluded the uniform law. Id.
162. A rider is defined as "[any kind of a schedule or writing annexed to a
document which cannot well be incorporated in the body of such document. Such
are deemed to be incorporated into the terms of the document .... With the use of
the rider the entire document does not have to be rewritten or redrafted again."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 687 (5th ed. 1979).
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form law and having the uniform laws apply to all international
sales of goods regardless of the parties' desires. 63
CONCLUSION
The unification of international trade law has been a goal
for decades and is almost a reality. The Sale of Goods Con-
vention is the world's first potentially successful attempt at
such unification. It will provide an environment that promotes
and strengthens international trade. However, universal inter-
pretation is essential to the unification of trade law. An inter-
pretation of article 6 to require express exclusions best com-
plies with the convention's principles of freedom of contract,
good faith, and fairness. Indeed, such a resolution is in ac-
cordance with the convention's overriding principle of uni-
formity, while at the same time balancing two fundamental ele-
ments of a contract, party autonomy and party protection.
Maureen T. Murphy*
163. The drafting committee rejected the option of having the uniform law ap-
ply regardless of the parties' desires. See S. SCHLECTRIEM, supra note 96, at 23.
* J.D. Candidate, 1990, Fordham University School of Law.
